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NATURE OF TH~ CASE 
Plaintiff - Respondent accepts statement of Defendant - AppelL 
adding only that the covenant not to compete was an integral part of a sa 
and purchase agreement of a business for the sum of One Hundred Ninety-T~ 
Thousand Dollars. 
DISPOSITION lfl LO\,/ER COURT 
The District Court for Salt Lake County held the death of Sell< 
Hyman Rudd, (Plaintiff-Respondent) did not terminate the obligation of Bu) 
Mel Parks, (Defendant-Appellant) to make payments set forth in a covenant 
to compete which is a part of an integrated contract to buy and sell a bus 
iness for an agreed price of $192,000.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have decision of District Court 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Through correspondence initiated by Defendant-Appellant (Rudd) 
consisting of three letters (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) Deceased, Hyman Rudd, 
entered into a firm agreement to sell his business to Defendant-Appellant, 
Mel Parks, (Parks) for the sum of $192,000.00 and Mr. Parks accepted. 
The letter dated September 19, 1973, stipulating the terms oft 
sale, drafted by Defendant-Appellants, provided the "Total Purchase price" 
at $192,000.00 and would be allocated in specific included amounts to thre 
items. 
Shortly prior to sale, deceased Seller, the father of two minor 
high school age children (Melinda and Jeffery) had a serious heart attack, 
-1-
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and this was his reason to sell. Both facts were known to Appellant, Parks 
(R 255-256, Lns. 27-10) Mr. Rudd died of an acute heart attack on October 29, 
1975. 
Plaintiff-Respondent accepts all factual statements of Defendant-
Appellant not contradictory to the foregoing. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE AGREEMENT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, BUYER, AND DECEASED 
SELLER IS A SINGLE, EtlTJ RE, INTEGRATED CONTRACT SUPPORTED 
BY A SINGLE CONSIDERATION A STATED SINGLE PURCHASE OF 
$192,000, FORMALIZED IN THREE INSTRUMENTS AT THE DESIGN 
OF THE BUYER, WITH MONEY ALLOCATIOrlS TO EACH ARBITRARILY 
DETERMlrlED BY BUYER AFTER HIS CONSULTATION \./ITH AND 
ADVICE OF A TAX ADVISER. 
I I. MR. RUDD, HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND HEIRS HAVE 
FULLY OBSERVED THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE. 
I 11. SELLER DRE\-/ THE CONTRACT, PROVIDED FOR PAYMENT OF A 
TOTAL SUM, AND IN COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE STATED THE 
PROVISIONS ARE TO APPLY TO AND BIND THE HEIRS, EXECU-
TORS AND ASSIGNS, AND SAID CONTRACT SHOULD BE STRICTLY 
CONSTRUED AGAINST DRAFT OR, \>/HO SHOULD NOT BE RELi EVED 
FROM HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY BY AN ACT OF GOD. 
IV. BOTH FACTS AND LAW REQUIRE IN EQUITY THE AFFIRMATION 
OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE LO\./ER COURT TO PREVENT FORFEI-
TURE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AGREEMENT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, BUYER, AND DECEASED 
SELLER IS A SINGLE, ENTIRE, INTEGRATED CONTRACT SUPPORTED 
BY A SINGL': CONSIDERATIO~l A STATED SINGLE PURCHASE OF 
$192, 000, FORMAL! ZED IN THREE INSTRUMENTS AT THE DES I GN 
OF THE BUYER, WITH MONEY ALLOCATIONS TO EACH ARBITRARILY 
DETERMINED BY BUYER AFTER HIS CONSULTATION WITH AND 
ADVICE OF A TAX ADVISER. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 consists of letters between Defendant-
Appellant as offerer and deceased Seller as final acceptor. 
-2-
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Appellant's First offer, dated September 6, 1973, was for $180,0C 
with included sums allocated to stipulated items within the assets of a 
business. 
Appellant's Second offer, Dated September 19, 1973, was for $192, 
with a change in value allocations calculated to bestow greatest benefit 
to Buyer. The tax detriments to the Seller almost nullify the $12,000 
purchase price increase. 
Appellant's Appellant's 
lst Offer 2nd Offer 
$180,000 Inc. $192,000 Inc. 
Goodwill: $15,000 $15,000 
Covenant Not To Compete: 65,000 95,000 
Equipment: 100,000 82,000 
Interest: 6 1/2% on unpaid bal. Included in $192,000 
The tax consequences of the change has a traumatic negative impac 
on the net returns of the Seller and a positively beneficial result for the 
Buyer. The capital gains return to Seller was reduced by lessening the valu 
of the equipment and the portion taxed to the Seller as ordinary income 
increased by increasing the amount allocated to the Covenant Not To Compete. 
It is an arbitrary change in value determination. Since the 
Covenant Not To Compete protects the good will (capital assets), how does 
Buyer, the Defendant-Appellant, justify the $30,000 increase in value of 
the non-compete element without an increase in value of the good will ele-
ment? Further, there was an actual decrease in the value of the quipment 
schedule (Capital Gain to Seller) to meet Seller's demand of a $12,000 in-
crease in Total Purchase Price to $192,000. It is apparent from these nego· 
tiations that the business was valued as a whole and the allocations were 
arbitrarily determined for tax purposes. 
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The Transcript establishes that the changes were calculated by 
Buyer to his advantage. Appellant testified his tax adviser established the 
final $95,000 value for the Non-Compete Agreement so he could deduct that 
sum as an operating expense, and without this allocation, he would not buy. 
(R 254 Ln 9 to end and R 255 to Ln 19) "That was the only terms on which I 
would buy". 
At the time of the deliberations, the effect of the death of 
Rudd on the performance of the contract never entered Parks' mind - "Didn't 
think anything about death" (R 3Lf2 Lns 19; R 250 and 251 Lns 147). 
The purpose of a non-compete covenant is to protect the good will 
of a business. Allen vs. Rose Park Pharmacy 120 U, 608; 237 P2d 823, and 
Appellant's Brief page 16). 
How does he then justify as reasonable a $95,000 value for the 
protection of a business asset whose value he assesses for tax purposes at 
only $15,000? 
How does Defendant-Appellant justify almost 50% of the total 
purchase of a business to protect its good 1-li 11 (one of its inc 1 uded assets 
whose value is less than 8% of the purchase price)? 
A $95,000 purchase price for the covenant not to compete buys 
Appellant no more protection insofar as recovery for breach is concerned than 
$60,000. Unlike insurance, increase of premium does not increase coverage. 
There is no stipulation for 1 iquidated damages and if Rudd has 
violated the contract, Defendant-Appellant's recourse would not have been 
refusal to make contract payments, but he would have been entitled to recover 
as damages only loss of profits. 
-4-
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The consideration for the covenant was the principal sum of 
$95,000 but such sum, as an accommodation to the Buyer, was payable over a 
period of time to spread the payments over a period of years. 
POI NT 11 
MR. RUDD, HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND HEIRS HAVE 
FULLY OBSERVED THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE. 
This contract is not analogous to a contract requiring affirmativ 
personal services such as the contract of a singer or dancer. Obviously, 
the contract of a singer or dancer is terminated on death since that person 
can no longer perform the services required and it is well settled that the 
impossibility of performance terminates the contract. 
In this case, Mr. Rudd was not required to do an affirmative act 
but to refrain from performing acts. 
With one notable exception, human experience indicates that Mr. 
Rudd will not return from death to establish a competing business. Mr. 
Rudd has in fact performed the ultimate act that assures and guarantees the 
Defendant-Appellant that his good will is secure from competition by Mr. 
Rudd! 
Those cases and authorities cited by Appellant's Counsel to indi-
cate that performance is discharged by death relate to performance or to 
exclusive rights for performance and are not applicable to this situation. 
17 Am Jur 2d page 829, refers to "The prevention by an act of God 
of full performance of the entire contract. .. " whereas in this case, full 
observance is assured by the act of God. 
There is no specific provision in the covenant relating to the 
-s-
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effect of the death of the Covenantor (Rudd) and the general authority is 
stated as fol lm·1s: 17A Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts page 626, 
11 Hm·1ever, it has been said that, with a few 
exceptions, contracts do not die with the 
contractor unless they contain a provision to 
that effect; and a contract will be construed 
as subject to an implied condition of survivor-
ship only when the continued existence of a 
party is ass urned as the basis of the agreement. 11 
17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts page 865, 
"The test for determining whether a particular 
contract is discharged by death has been said 
to be whether it is of such a character that it 
may be performed by the promiser's personal 
representative ... '' 
In the instant case, the personal representative of the deceased has exclusive 
right to the name of the deceased and she and/or the heirs could have entered 
a competing business or could have refrained from so doing. They and each of 
them refrained, and therefore the contract has been fully observed. 
POINT I I I 
SELLER DREW THE CONTRACT, PROVIDED FOR PAYMENT OF A 
TOTAL SUM, AND IN COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE STATED THE 
PROVISIONS ARE TO APPLY TO AND BIND THE HEIRS, EXECU-
TORS AND ASS I GllS, AND SAi D COMTRACT SHOULD BE STRICTLY 
CONSTRUED AGAINST DRAFTOR, WHO SHOULD NOT BE RELIEVED 
FROM HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY BY AN ACT OF GOD. 
Mr. Parks (Defendant-Appel I ant) in drafting the instrument that is 
the subject of this case, could have provided that Mr. Rudd would receive a 
certain payment for each month in 1·1hich he did not compete until the death 
of Mr. Rudd and that the contract would terminate on death and not be payable 
to the heirs, executors and assigns. Mr. Parks did not avail himself of these 
alternatives, but to the contrary provided for the payment of the sum of 
$95,000 and for his convenience made the sum payable in monthly installments 
-6-
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over a period of years to a given specific date. Mr. Parks further provided 
that the contract was binding on the heirs, executors and assigns of the 
parties. 
The Covenant Not to Compete in essence combines t1,10 agreements: 
l. A Promissory note in the amount of $95,000 payable to 
Mr. Rudd, his heirs and assigns, and payable in installmen 
2. An agreement of Mr. Rudd not to compete with Mr. Parks. 
If Mr. Parks had paid the $95,000 coincidentally with the executio 
of the contract rather than conveniencing himself by making the payments over 
a period of time, then, assuming, arguendo, that the death of Mr. Rudd was a 
breach of contract, Mr. Parks would have to attend the Court and show the 
da1nages incurred by Mr. Parks as a result of the untimely death of Mr. 
Rudd. Such damages, if any there were, may or may not have been equal to 
the sum of $1,500 per month. It is not equitable for Mr. Pad;s to now claim 
that because he, in drafting his contracts, developed for himself a conven-
ient payment program, that the monthly payments constitute an agreement in 
relation to 1 iquidated damages. 
The Trial Court found the intent of the parties at the time of 
signing was to create a package deal as a result of which Buyer got all he 
dealt for and he should pay a full purchase price of $192,000; $95,000 of 
which was attributed, for the tax and business purposes of the Buyer, to a 
covenant not to compete (R 192, 193 and Findings of Fact 13 and 14). 
The Court concluded, "The entire Contract of Sale of the Salt Lake 
Sanitation Business was one contract involving a total consideration of 
$192,000 which consideration for business purposes and tax benefits of the 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Buyer, was divided into three parts, and the Defendant is not excused from 
the payment of any portion of the purchase price." 
Argument supporting Points I and I I are adequate to establish the 
premise of Point I I I as it applies to the instant case. 
Reference to the Covenant Not to Compete instrument itself (Exhibit 
lP) gives additional support. 
The instrument is dated October 1, 1973 and stipulates non-competition 
"For a period of five years from the date hereof". 
It stipulates payment of $95,000. No payments were required for 
the first three months. The first payment of $6ji.OQOCwas required on January 
20, 1974, and thereafter, monthly installments of $1 ,500 on the 20th day of 
each successive month until the purchase price was paid in full. The time 
periods are not identical date intervals and show them to be totally inde-
pendent and severed of each other. The totality of the amount due and the 
specified final date of payment give proof of the totality and indivisibility 
of the payment in this instrument. This covenant falls within the framework 
of an entire agreement with a total six figure price of $192,000. 
This instrument further stipulates, "It is expressly understood 
that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors 
and administrators of the respective parties". 
The law requires every effort must be made to give reasonable 
interpretation to a contract and must strictly construe against the party 
drawing it (Guinand vs. Walton 22 U2d 196; 450 P2d 467) especially if a 
forfeiture is involved, \1ingets, Incorporated vs. Bitters 28 U2d 231; 500 P2d 
1007. It follrn·1s that this sentence particularly highlighted by its intro-
duction means that the Estate of Hy Rudd will pay damages to the Buyer to 
-8-
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compensate for acts of competition by the minor children of the Seller should 
he die during the five years. 
The Court found the children had not competed (Findings of Fact 
[Rl92] Finding #10). 
Ul1nann vs. Sunset-McKee Co., March 1955 9th Circuit, 221 Fed 2d 
128, supports the judgment here. The parties in the Trial Court stipulated 
deceaased was to refrain from competition during the three years he was to 
draw a monthly pension, after he completed a working career with Sunset-McKee. 
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court which upheld Company's 
refusal to pay after employee's death declaring; 
Page 132. "But the Court chooses prirnari ly to 
uphold the contract as binding for the reason that 
the consideration to support the Company 1s obliga-
tion is to be found in Ulmann, Sr. being requi-
red not to compete by soliciting for any other 
employer his so called 'protected accounts' ... " 
The cases cited by Defendant-Appellant are readily distinguishable 
from the matter here, and are not entitled to consideration. 
First case is Keller vs. California Liquid Gas, August, 1973 Wyo., 
363 Fed Supp 123. Defendant, California Gas Co. bought two businesses, a 
wholesale liquid gas company and a liquid gas appliance company from the 
Sellars. Terms of sale of the business are not stated in the Covenant Not to 
Compete nor are they referred to in any "''ay. Ancillary to the sale of the 
above businesses, Sellers, by separate agreement, also entered into a 10 year 
non compete agreement by sellers for which buyers were to pay $100,000 in 10 
yearly installments of $10,000 each, on October 30th of each succeeding year. 
Sellers crashed in an air accident the year fol lowing sale. 
-9-
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Central to Court's decision was the fact that the children of the 
deceased who are co-plaintiffs, had aggressively competed against defendant. 
The Court, treating this fact, declared: 
Page 128. ''The right to specific performance depends 
upon circumstances and conditions in addition to the 
existence of a valid contract. Though the contract 
be free from fraud, mistake or other feature that 
would authorize a Court to set it aside, equitable 
relief may be denied if in acting under it plaintiffs 
have resorted to unfair conduct. These are all 
expressions commonly used in elaboration of the 
hoary maxim, 'He who comes into equity must come 
with clean hands' ••• Plaintiffs would ask the 
Court to allow them to compete against the Defen-
dant while still requiring payments under a 
covenant, which as shown, has ceased to exist. 
The Court cannot be party to such an unconscion-
ab 1 e bargain." 
It dealt with the death issue terminative of the not to co~~ete 
clause because these were frowned upon as in restraint of trade. 
The Keller contract was not entire in the sense that it was 
integrated with the other elements of the purchase in a single price. 
The Keller case further made no provision about heirs and 
administrators as the instant case. 
Interesting is the observation of the Circuit Court in the 
Ulmann case (supra): 
. 
Page 133. 11\~hile always a court must seek to dlitvine 
the intent of the parties, it may be doubtful if 
the parties here ever put their minds to the 
question of 'Suppose Ulmann Sr. dies', yet the 
underlying tenor of the agreement seems to be 
that the Company ~1as willing to reward Ulmann, 
Sr. with a total of ~5,400 payable in 36 install-
ments of $150 each ••• " 
Also, (8,9)" ••• If the construction of the agreement 
here (which seems to have been designed and executed 
by the sales department) is an unsatisfactory one for 
Sunset-McGee, it is a matter within the company's 
power to correct in drawing future contracts, 
-10-
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but if there is a doubt, the employee (or his estate), 
if the e::iployer selects the word>, should fiave the 
advantage of his boss's language which is suscep-
tible of t1,10 intrinsically reasonable but oppo-
site constructions." (Emphasis added) 
In Jones vs. Servel, Inc., Indiana, 1962, 186 NE (2) 689, the 
deceased was not only not to compete during the relevant period, but was al 
required to perform affirmatively: 
Page 691. "You 1,1ill ••• act in an advisory capacity, 
as a consultant to this corporation and any of its 
subsidiaries in connection with any matters relative 
to the business and affairs of said corporations, it 
being understood that you will hold yourself available 
to render the services which are required of you 
hereunder and wil 1 not engage in any other business 
or activities ••• or maintain a place of residence, 
which in any case unreasonably interferes with 
performance by you hereunder ••• " 
This argument included serving on Board of Directors and officer of any 
subsidiary to which he might be elected. 
The facts of Jones vs. Joy tlanufacturing, Mo. 1964, 381 SH 2d 86: 
involves a contract of employment whereby, 
Page 862. ""Joy hereby agrees to continue the 
employment of Jones in the position of District 
Manager of its Coal Machinery Division •.• during 
the term and subject to the provisions of this 
agreement. 11 
Jones died during the life of the contract. 
In the context of the facts, we, too, can endorse Appellant's 
quote. (Appellant's Brief, page 25). Obviously, the ability to perform the 
affirmative acts terminated on his death. 
POltlT IV 
BOTH FACTS AND LAW REQUIRE IN EQUITY THE AFFIRMATION 
OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT TO PREVENT FORFEI-
TURE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
Seller's heart trouble knrn,rn to Buyer motivated sale and permitti 
-11-
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Buyer to allocate values arbitrarily to items constituting Seller's business 
to Buyer's best tax interest without relation to actual values of elements. 
The Trial Courts Findings supported by the evidence carries its 
O\'ln dignity. 
From the standpoint of equity, if death as an act of God excuses 
perf~rmance then a judgment should not require a forfeiture, when a deliberate 
breach entails only such damages as the aggrieved party could prove. Carried 
to a logical conclusion, neither the decedent seller with heart attack, so 
knmm by buyer, 1-1ho had sold with arbitrary values imposed by the buyer, 
nor that buyer who claims he hadn't given a thought to the death of the 
seller at the time of entering into the contract, could contend it was the 
intent of the parties that buyer be absolved from payment if seller died. 
Against the backdrop of buyer's drawing non compete instrument dated October 
l, 1973 with the initial payment due January 20, 1974, is it reasonable to 
accept Defendant's contention that buyer was relieved of the obligation to 
pay any consideratio~~eller were to have died on January 19, 1974? 
An act of God having excused the observance of this negative 
covenant, it is incumbent on the Court to determine the equities of both 
parties in terms of benefits received as well as services performed. 
Although this is not a proper instance of frustration, Castagna 
vs. Church, Utah, Aug. 1976; 552 P2d 1282, states a principle regarding 
damages which does equity here: 
Page 1284. "If it was foreseeable there should 
have been provision for it in the contract, and 
the absence of such a provision gives rise to 
the inference that the risk was assumed." 
" •.. a vendee has the right to insist upon perfor-
mance by the vendor to the extent the latter is 
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able to perform with an abatement in the purchase 
price equal to the value of the deficiency or 
defect." 
and, the Defendant-Appellant has proved no damage. 
To find for Defendant-Appellant would require a finding that the 
parties impliedly agreed that Seller's remaining alive wa~ a condition pre-
cedent to Buyer's monthly payment and that the liquidated agreed darr.ages wer 
equal to the unpaid portion of the price. The Court by so doing would graft 
tv10 ne~~ provisions in the contract neither of which was in the contemplatior. 
of the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Appellant agrees "There is no question that the parties 
intended that a covenant not to compete be a part of a sales transaction bet 
Hyrum Rudd a.1d Mel Parks", as stated in Appellant's Brief (Conclusion). The 
is no question that Parks offered $180,000 and when this was refused, offe" 
$192,000 which was accepted. There is no question, the included value elen 
was maneuvered by Parks under expert tax guidance without regard to value of 
the constituting assets of the business; without concern or thought to the 
consequences of the death of Hy Rudd, though he knew of Rudd's state of 
health, but only with concern for beneficial tax consequences to the Buyer. 
If Appellant 1 s intent was not to continue payments after the deal 
of Rudd, he could have removed the uncertainty from the provision when he 
wrote the instrument. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Trial Cou~ 
sitting as a court of equity should be affirmed. 
-i3-
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DATED this __ day of Ap ri 1, 1978. 
,/ 
/ 
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Respectfully submitted, 
BERNARD L. ROSE 
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